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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JAMES & JACKSON LLC, individually and ) 
derivatively on behalf of MBC, GOSPEL ) 
NETWORK, LLC., ) 





EVANDER HOLYFIELD, JR., WILLIE E. ) 
GARY, CECIL FIELDER, LORENZO ) 
WILLIAMS, THOMAS WEIKSNAR, CHAN ) 
ABNEY, LORI METOYER-BROWN, and ) 
RICK NEWBERGER, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
On April 13, 2009, counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument 
on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. After reviewing the briefs submitted on 
the Motion, the record of the case, and the arguments presented by counsel, the Court 
hereby finds as follo'!Vs: 
f 
STATEMENT OF FACTS • 
In 1998, Alvin James and Marlon Jackson (operating as James & Jackson, L.L.C. 
"J&J"),1 joined forces with investors led by Willie Gary, {operating under the umbrella of 
,1 , , 
, 
1 In April 1998, Plaintiffs Alvin James and Marlon Jackson, principles of J&J, and 
President and Chairman, respectively, of Minority Broadcasting Corporation of America, 
Inc., a Texas Corporation -- later "re-branded" as the Black Family Channel ("BFC") in 
2004 -- approached Willie E. Gary ("Gary") with an offer to invest in an African 
American, religion-based, cable television network. Defendants' Mot. For SJ, Exh. 1; 
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. For SJ at 2. 
1 
"Willie Gary L.L.C."),2 to form MBC Gospel Network, L.L.C ("MBC")3 a religiously 
oriented cable television channel dedicated to serving the African American community. 
Initially, J&J held a 25% interest in MBC to WGLLC's 75% interest, but that was 
modified a year later when WGLLC increased its interest to BO% while J&J's interest 
decreased to 20% under the terms of an Amended Operating Agreement ("AROA,,).4 
J&J invested no capital in the enterprise, though by July 2003, WGLLC claims to have 
contributed more than $31 million in capital.5 Initially, shareholders of J&J were 
responsible for the day-to-day management of MBC, but by April 2000, all had been 
replaced by representatives of WGLLC, including Willie Gary, who served as CEO of 
2 Gary recruited twenty six colleagues and friends who formed Willie Gary LLC 
('WGLLC") for the sole purpose of investing in the cable network proposed by J&J. 
Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, p. 3 at 12. 
3 On November 11, 199B, J&J and WGLLC entered into an Operating Agreement to 
form MBC Gospel Network LLC ("MBC"), a Delaware Limited Liability Company. 
4 J&J and WGLLC allocated 25% interest in MBC to J&J and 75% interest to WGLLC, 
contingent upon WGLLC funding the capital account of MBC in the amount of $2 million, 
which WGLLC did fund. Defendants' Mot. For SJ, Exh. 4, 9; Defendants' Deposition 
Excerpts in Support of Mot. For SJ, Exh. 9 at 56. The Board of directors of MBC as of 
November 24, 199B, consisted of seven persons: Gary (Chairman), Cecil Fielder, 
Evander Holyfield, Marlon Jackson (COO), Alvin James (CEO), Lorenzo Williams and 
Lori Metoyer-Brown. Id. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. For SJ, 
Exh. 25, Memo at p. 2. 
On December 23, 1999, WGLLC and J&J entered into an Amended and Restated 
Operating Agreement for MBC under which WGLLC and J&J acquired an BO% and 
20% interest, respectively, in MBC. Defendants' Motion for SJ, Exh. 14 at B. 
At the time of MBC's merger with Programming, Rick Newberger, CEO, held a 3% 
interest in the company. 
5 In addition to making an initial $2 million deposit to the MBC capital account in 199B, 
WGLLC solicited and received capital contributions from WGLLC members in the 
amount of approximately $2 million in September 1999, $1.7 million in November 1999, 
and $1.4 million in January 2000. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
Mot. For SJ at 6-7, Exh. 27 WGLLC claims it made a total of $31 ,025,376 in capital 
contributions to MBC through July 11, 2003. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts, p. 10 at 65; Defendants' Mot for SJ, Exh. 25. 
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MBC until August 2004.6 In 2004, Gary resigned as CEO and appointed Rick 
Newberger as the new CEO and Acting President while Gary retained his position as 
Chairman of the Board.7 
In April 2004, the Management Board of MBC voted to change the name of MBC 
to the "Black Family Channel" ("BFC") and the change took effect in October 2004. The 
change was in name only, as the corporate entity remained MBC (referred to herein as 
"MBC"). 
As of November 2004, MBC had not realized its financial business goals and was 
a defendant in at least 10 lawsuits seeking payments on a range of financial obligations, 
including some in the amount of $500,000 and $1.35 million. MBC was consistently 
undercapitalized and never turned a profit. Additionally, members of J&J, as well as 
WGLLC, repeatedly tried to raise financing for MBC, but these arrangements never 
materialized. 8 During this time period, several MBC Board members loaned money to 
MBC. 9 
6 As of April 7, 2000, Gary (in his individual capacity) assumed the duties of MBC CEO, 
replacing James. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. For SJ at 7, 
Exh.29. On October 15,2000, Gary removed Jackson as President of MBC. Id. at 8, 
EXh.30. On September 14, 2001, Gary removed Thorpe and Harden from their 
respective positions as MBC legal advisor and MBC treasurer. Id. at 8, Exhibt 32. 
7 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. For SJ, Exh. 37. 
8 For example, on August 22, 2003, MBC engaged the Gordian Group to raise capital 
for MBC. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts, Exh. 32. On Nov. 5, 2004, 
WGLLC and J&J signed a Contingent Agreement to accept a $138 million structured 
debt transaction offer from the Structured Capital Group, Inc. (USCG"). Plaintiff's 
Statement of Material Facts, p. 22, Exh. 39, 82. Defendants allege that the deal with 
SCG was not consummated because J&J could not pay the $400,000 fee required for 
due diligence and closing costs that J&J had committed to fund. Defendants' Deposition 
Excerpts in Support of Mot. For SJ, Newberger Dep. At 220-225; Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support of Mot. For SJ at 13-14. J&J alleges that Defendants "did not 
attempt to close the deal that J&J had negotiated" with SCG, but that Defendants 
instead pursued private negotiations with SCG. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to 
3 
The inability of the parties to agree 10 on various aspects of a proposed 
restructuring deal with SCG led WGLLC to file suit against J&J in Delaware Chancery 
Court in November 2005, alleging that J&J's refusal to agree to a pro-rata dilution 11 as 
part of a proposed restructuring deal had terminated the deal. WGLLC charged that the 
refusal by J&J to agree to any pro-rata dilution had the effect of "extorting Willie Gary to 
reduce its ownership to less than a majority (49%) in order to secure" the necessary 
financing from SCG.12 The lawsuit sought a preliminary injunction requiring J&J to 
Defendants' Mot for SJ, p. 11. Defendants assert that J&J's plan was an overtly hostile 
takeover and that after the original financing deal with SCG collapsed, that they were 
approached by SCG to "do a straight deal" for a $56 million transaction. That proposed 
deal was memorialized on May 31,2005. Defendants' Deposition Excerpts in Support of 
Mot. For SJ, Newberger Dep. At 222. On October 27, 2005, the MBC management 
Board met to consider the proposed $56 financing deal through SCG. J&J voted to 
admit the arranger but only on the condition that J&J would not be subject to any 
dilution as a result of the addition of new members. Exhibits to Defendants' Mot for SJ, 
Exh.44, 
9 Of those MBC Board members who loaned money to MBC from July 1, 2003 to 
August 31,2004, the following also were officers of MBC: Gary (Chairman and CEO); 
Lorenzo Williams, Evander Holyfield, and Chan Abney. Plaintiff's Response in 
Opposition to Defendants' Mot. For SJ, Exh. 34, 25. According to Plaintiffs, from July 1, 
2003, to August 31, 2004, MBC borrowed $8.58 million from WGLLC and individual 
investors. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. For SJ at 9, Exh. 34. 
Gary personally loaned MBC approximately $3 million at 25% interest, as of April 9, 
2004. lQ. at 9, Exh. 35. According to Defendants, however, this interest rate was later 
retroactively reduced in August 2005 to "a reasonable 'arms length' interest rate" of six 
percent per annum. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts at 80, p. 12, Exh. 27. 
By July 31, 2005, the loans totaled $15.4 million. Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, 
p. 19, Exh. 38. 
10 Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Exh. 83, Transcript of Delaware Court Office 
Conference. On December 2, 2005, WGLLC filed a Second Amended Complaint, 
adding a claim for judicial dissolution pursuant to 6 Dec. C. § 18-202. Plaintiff's 
Statement of Material Facts, p. 25; Exhibits to Defendants' Mot for SJ, Exh. 48. 
11 According to the AROA, no additional capital contributions were permitted without 
majority agreement of the Members. Additionally, WGLLC was given "the sole 
responsibility for all additional capital contributions .... " Plaintiff's Statement of 
Material Facts, Exh. 26. 
12 Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, p. 3, para. 14 (emphasis in the 
original). 
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agree to the dilution, but the Chancery Court declined to grant the injunction. Instead, 
the Court urged the parties to negotiate or face dissolution. 
On January 26, 2006, WGLLC hired Shannon Pratt Valuations, LLC ("Shannon 
Pratt") to provide a valuation of MBC "as of December 31, 2005, for the purpose of 
dissolution under Delaware State Statutes.,,13 On March 15, 2006, counsel for WGLLC 
wrote to counsel for J&J exploring agreement on a "proposed procedure for the 
dissolution/auction of the company as a going concern.,,14 A letter from WGLLC counsel 
to Vice Chancellor Strine that same day informed the Delaware Court that the J&J no 
longer opposed the WGLLC "request for dissolution," and that counsel for WGLLC was 
"endeavor[ing] to coordinate with defense counsel to determine ... at least a proposed 
procedure to allow for an auction of the company .... ,,15 
In March 2006, as J&J pressed for dissolution of the company under the 
auspices of the Delaware Court, WGLLC pursued the alternative strategy of a corporate 
freeze-out merger which would remove J&J as a member of MBC.16 On March 16, 
2006, counsel for WGLLC in the Delaware litigation emailed WGLLC legal counsel Tom 
Weiksnar ('Weiksnar") reporting a conversation with Shannon Pratt and noting "we may 
also need his opinion for use in a 'freeze out merger.,,17 A separate email sent by 
13 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot for SJ, Exh. 42. 
14 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot for SJ, Exh. 84. 
15 Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Exh. 87. (Note: The Delaware Litigation was 
dismissed by agreement of the parties in August 2006). Defendant's Statement of 
Material Facts, Exh. 59. 
16 Defendants assert that on April 4, 2006, during a status conference with Chancellor 
Strine, WGLLC first learning of the possibility of a freeze-out merger. Defendant's 
Deposition Excerpts in Support of Mot. for SJ, Deposition of Willie E. Gary, p. 179-81. 
This notwithstanding, the record reflects March emails between counsel for WGLLC 
discussing the option of a freeze-out merger. 
17 Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Exh. 92. 
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WGLLC member and MBC Board member Maria Sperando to WGLLC counsel on 
March 16, 2006, requested that the issue of the "squeeze [out] merger" be added to the 
agenda for a conference call scheduled for later that day to discuss the Delaware 
litigation. 18 Another email from WGLLC counsel Francis Pileggi to Weiksnar sent March 
16th and marked "confidential" disclosed that Pileggi had asked Shannon Pratt to have 
his report ready "between April 15 and April 30 [as] we may need his opinion for use in 
a 'freeze out merger.'" 
On April 12, 2006, Weiksnar prepared a draft agenda for an April 18, 2006 MBC 
Board meeting, which omitted any reference to a merger. MBC CEO Newberger replied 
to Weiksnar the same day by email, commenting that the agenda "reads very mild and 
unalarming," and observing that the agenda was prepared "[p]robably the right way in 
case it were to 'leak' to the press or employees." Newberger also observed that they 
could probably provide a more detailed agenda immediately prior to the start of the 
meeting. 
On April 13, 2006, Thomas Martin provided WGLLC counsel, Francis Pileggi and 
Bernard Conaway, with a "Memorandum to File" detailing the possible remedy of a 
freeze out merger, including the duties owed by Gary and other members of WGUC to 
MBC and J&J.19 That memo expressly anticipated that Gary's duty of loyalty as a 
majority member and manager of MBC would be challenged in the proposed freeze out 
merger where WGLLC "would have to vote its 80% MBC interest in favor of the 
merger.20 This memo also stated that because Gary was an interested 
18 Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, Exh. 94. 
19 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 61. 
20 Id. at p. 3. 
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member/manager in the merger transaction, the presumptions of Delaware's business 
judgment rule would not apply and Gary would have the burden of proving the entire 
fairness of the transaction.21 
On April 13, 2006, WGLLC sent notification of a special meeting of the MBC 
Board of Directors scheduled for April 18, 2006. The notice listed "[p]otential merger 
into a new entity to operate without James & Jackson," along with "[b]ankruptcy" and 
"[s]hut down of operations," among the items on the agenda.22 This meeting notice was 
the first time J&J learned of WGLLC's merger plans. The following day, on April 14th, 
Matthew Hardin Jr. on behalf of J&J requested full disclosure of information about the 
proposed merger. Although a detailed opinion letter had been issued on April 13, 2006, 
to Willie Gary individually, that letter, as well as other related information about the 
merger that also was requested, was not provided to J&J.23 Instead, Rick Newberger 
responded by email to Harden and other MBC Board members saying, among other 
things, "There is no merger proposal. Item 5 is a theory that was advanced by a Board 
member yesterday about how the company could possibly be saved. No merger target 
has been identified and no work has been undertaken on planning related thereto. The 
idea was raised ... this week (emphasis added).,,24 
21 Id. 
22 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 45. 
23 On April 14, 2006, in response to an email sent by Weiksnar notifying the MBC Board 
that MBC chairman Newberger had called for a Board meeting on April 18, J&J, by way 
of a letter from Harden (of J&J) to Newberger, requested "full and complete information 
concerning the proposed merger." Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' 
Mot. for SJ, Exh. 46. 
24 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 47 (emphasis 
added). 
7 
On April 16th, WGLLC called a meeting of its members to discuss the future of 
MBC. Although individual members of WGLLC had been planning the merger for as 
long as a month, J&J was provided with only five days advance notice of the merger 
discussion. Additionally, the April 18th Board meeting, was the first time that the MBC 
Board discussed the merger plan. At that meeting, the MBC Board voted to form a 
special strategy committee to discuss the possibility of bankruptcy, a freeze-out merger, 
and the shutdown of MBC.25 The five-member committee included two members of 
WGLLC (one of whom did not participate in subsequent committee deliberations), two 
members of J&J, and Tom Weiksnar, a lawyer with the Willie Gary law firm who did 
legal work for WGLLC, but who was not a member of WGLLC.26 The April 18th 
meeting was continued to April 20th. On April 19, Matthew Hardin again contacted 
Rick Newberger requesting information about the proposed merger and requesting 
WGLLC to proceed with an auction of MBC as originally planned.27 
After two days of investigation by the special committee, Weiksnar provided a 
"summary of the Strategy Meeting" to the MBC Board, which approved the freeze out 
merger. All members of J&J voted "no," and all members of WGLLC voted "yes," 
including those allegedly "interested directors" who had also served on the special 
25 During the April 18, 2006, Board meeting of MBC, the Board voted to form a special 
strategy committee to meet on April 19 and April 20 to discuss, among other things, the 
possibility of bankruptcy of MBC, potential merger without J&J "giving J&J fair value for 
its 20% interest," and shutdown of MBC operations. Plaintiff's Response in Opposition 
to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 51. 
26 The following individuals (listed with their affiliations) were appointed to the 
Committee by unanimous approval: Harden (J&J), James (J&J), Weiksnar, Mr. Williams 
(WGLLC), Ms. Abney (WGLLC). Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. 
for SJ, Exh. 51. 
27 Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Exh. 
52. 
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committee. The following members of WGLLC who served on the Board of MBC, voted 
to approve the merger of MBC into Programming Acquisitions, a company wholly owned 
by WGLLC: Chan Bryant Abney, Lori Metoyer Brown, Willie Gary, and Lorenzo 
Williams. Maria P. Sperando, a member of WGLLC, voted "present, but not 
participating" during the merger vote. Rick Newberger, CEO of MBC and member of 
WGLLC, did not vote on the merger. Weiksnar also voted yes. 
The MBC Board also voted to accept the Shannon Pratt valuation, which, 
according to WGLLC, assigned a nominal value of $1 to the company. As a result, J&J 
received $.20 for its 20% interest in MBC. However, a May 3, 2006, email from 
WGLLC counsel Pileggi to Shannon Pratt revealed that Shannon Pratt was still "working 
towards providing a letter of opinion" and that he had not provided a final, official 
valuation of MBC at the time of the merger. More than ten days after the merger vote, 
Pileggi's email to Shannon Pratt emphasized that: 
[I]t is imperative to remember that we did the recent merger based on our 
understanding from conversations with your colleagues that the 'current' 
value of J and J's interest in the company is 'not more than zero', [sic] and 
we have indicated as much to them. Thus, we need your formal report as 
soon as possible in the even that they contest that position - and to 
support our position.,,28 
On May 9, Shannon Pratt valued the company on an "as is" basis as of December 31 , 
2005, at a median value of negative $10.2 million.29 
On April 25, MBC (doing business as the Black Family Channel or "BFC") was 
merged into Programming Acquisitions ("Programming"). MBC's voting interests were 
valued at one dollar and 100 shares of Programming were issued in exchange. The 
28 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 14, 15, 16. 
29 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 17, 18. 
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merger was effectuated on April 26, 2006, with Programming, a Delaware limited liability 
corporation, which had been formed by WGLLC just six days earlier, as the surviving 
corporate entity. Programming retained the dba BFC. 
On December 11, 2006, Gary circulated a "Summary of Terms for Proposed 
Investment" in Programming/BFC by the investment group InterMedia Partners VII, L.P. 
("lnterMedia,,).30 Under the terms of the proposed investment, InterMedia would invest 
up to $30 into Programming/BFC, or a new LLC, with an initial investment at closing not 
to exceed $10 million.31 Documents provided by Defendants describe, "as a first step," 
a $10 million payment to BFC, "which would be used to fully satisfy outstanding 
indebtedness to the trades, IRS and all other creditors.,,32 Cecil Fielder, Willie Gary, 
Evander Holyfield, Maria Sperando (whose signature is missing) and Lorenzo Williams 
executed the Merger Agreement as "shareholders." All had previously been 
shareholders of WGLLC. 
One year after the MBC Board voted to approve the merger, on April 30, 2007, 
Gospel Music Channel purchased Programming/BFC for $10 million, plus 2.943 million 
shares, and other consideration (the "GMC/Programming Merger"). Under the terms of 
that deal, Programming assigned its interest in a satellite distribution agreement with a 
Colorado company that carried the BFC cable signal.33 That distribution agreement had 
been an asset of MBC since 2000. 
30 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 57. 
31 Id. 
32 Defendant's Mot. for SJ, Exh. 62. 
33 The Service Transmission Agreement between HITS and MBC was dated April 25, 
2000, and originally provided for satellite distribution of the MBC signal. Plaintiff's 
Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for S.J.Exh. 20, 58. 
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According to Defendants, in order to renegotiate MBC's original agreements for 
the benefit of GMC, including MBC's original MSO agreements, it was necessary for 
MBC's carriage and satellite debts, as well as its vendor debt, to be paid.34 Undated 
documents provided by Defendants, but which appear to confirm these disbursements, 
list approximately $12 million paid to numerous entities, including loan repayments to 
Gary, and other members of WGLLC. Ten million of this $12 million is listed as "paid," 
while $2 million is listed as "loan proceeds.,,35 Defendants assert that Programming still 
holds a loan due from GMC, a note from the Florida News Channel, which is being paid 
monthly, and the majority of third party loans that were made to MBC prior to the 
merger.36 Defendants assert that WGLLC has not been reimbursed for all of its capital 
contributions to MBC and that individual members of WGLLC and Gary, and others who 
made loans to MBC have not been repaid "those loans in full nor any interest.,,37 
Defendants represent that WGLLC was and remains the sole shareholder of 
Programming. 38 The record, however, contains references to 3% individual interests to 
be granted to Rick Newberger and Willie Gary. 39 Additionally, Programming's 
subsequent 2007 Merger Agreement is signed by WGLLC for Programming as well as 
by "shareholders" including Cecil Feilder, Willie Gary, Evander Holyfield, Lorenzo 
Williams, and Maria Sperando (whose signature block is listed, but not executed).40 
34 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, at 185-90. 
35 Defendant's Mot. for SJ, Exh. 62. 
36 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts at 191. 
37 Id. at 191-194. 
38 See e.g. Defendant Interrogatory Responses dated Nov. 21,2007. 
39 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exh.56. 
40 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Exh.58 
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WGLLC members are indirect owners of Programming by virtue of the majority interest 
in Programming of WGLLC. 
A central issue of contest between the parties is the value of MBC at the time of 
the merger. In addition to the Shannon Pratt valuation, the record contains the following 
facts regarding the value of MBC. During the April 18, 2006, Board meeting of MBC, 
J&J offered to buy MBC, or WGLLC's share of MBC, for $17 million. WGLLC member 
and MBC Board member, Evander Holyfield, counter-offered that WGLLC would "buy 
J&J's interest [in MBC] for $17 million."41 Additionally, several months earlier, on 
January 31,2006, MBC CEO Newberger had represented in an email to a potential 
investor that a valuation of MBC in the "range of $100 million can easily be established 
and defended" even given MBC's "negative-cash-flow condition."42 Two years earlier, in 
2004, Newberger had represented to the Gordian Group his estimate of MBC's value at 
between $35 million and $63 million ("pre-money"/before investor funding) and between 
$82 million and $110 million post-investor funding.43 Plaintiffs also point to the 
GMC/Programming Merger valued at approximately $25 million and based in part on 
the HITS Agreement originally held by MBC as evidence that the $1.00 merger price 
was unfair to J&J. Additionally, In January 2009, J&J submitted the affidavit of its 
financial expert, Robert P. Gray, estimating the value of J&J's 20% interest in MBC as 
of December 31,2005 at $43.31 million and as of April 30, 2006, at $57.94 million.44 
41 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 51. 
42 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 55. 
43 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 33. 
44 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 23(B). 
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Defendants, however, maintain that by October, 2005, MBC had entered the 
"zone of insolvency" and was not able to meet its obligations as they came due.45 
Therefore, notwithstanding the other indicators of MBC's value, Defendants contend 
that MBC was properly valued at the nominal sum of $1.00 at the time of the merger.46 
Defendants also allege a series of facts in support of their unclean hands 
argument including that J&J, in violation of the AROA, tried to advance cable television 
business interests separate from MBC beginning in 2001.47 Among J&J's activities 
during this time was the circulation of a private placement memorandum and business 
plan to raise capital for J&J Media business opportunities.48 Additionally, Gary claims 
that he was notified on November 20, 1998, that Pacific Family Entertainment LLC (aka 
TLC Communications, Inc., a California Corporation) was in possession of a "half-a-
million dollar judgment" against James and the Minority Broadcasting Corporation of 
America, Inc.49 According to Gary, "at the time of [his] inducement to invest in" MBC, 
James had failed to inform him of this outstanding judgment.5o 
On the following page, the Court has represented the affiliations and relevant 
actions of the key parties involved in this suit. 
45 Pratt Depo. At 32,35,36; Gary Affd. ~ 21; Newberger Affd. ~ 11. 
46 Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Mot. for SJ, Exh. 
47 In the first quarter of 2001, J&J members organized J&J Media Group, Inc., "in an 
effort to move ahead with its business objectives separately from MBC as it was 
obvious that [Gary] had taken control of MBC and was looking to diminish J&J's 
involvement." Defendants' Motion for SJ, Exh. 14 at Section 1.8. 
481d. 
49 Defendants' Mot. For SJ, Exh. 5, 6. 
50 Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, p. 2 at 9. 
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James & WGLLC MBC Board MBC Special MBC Merger Approve Sale of 
Jackson Member Member Committee Vote Programming 
Member Member 
Chan Bryan X X X X (Yes) 
Abnev 
Lori Metoyer X X X (Yes) 
Brown (Mgt. T.) 
Cecil Fielder X X (Not Present) X 
(Vice Chair) 





Matthew Harden X X X X (No) 
Jr. CFO) 
Evander Holyfield X X (Not Present) X 
(Mgt. T.) 
Marlon Jackson X X X (No) 
(COO) 
Alvin James X X X X (No) 
(CEO from 
1998- 2000) 
Rick Newberger X X [CEO, but no 
(CEO from signature on 
2004-2006) Merger 
AQreementl 
Maria Sperando X X X ("Present X 
but not 
participating") 
Gregory Thorpe X X X (No) 
Tom Weiksnar Provided Legal X X X (Yes) [Secretary, but 
Services. no signature on 
Merger 
Agreement] 
Lorenzo Williams X X (Mgt. T.) X X (Yes) X 
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STANDARD OF LAW 
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that "there 
is no genuine issue of material facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, to 
warrant judgment as a matter of law. 51 
The internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions involving officers and directions, shall be 
regulated by the law of the state of incorporation.52 Therefore, Delaware law applies. 
ARGUMENTS 
Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no standing to bring the derivative claims, and seek 
summary judgment on the direct claims arguing that Defendants breached no fiduciary duties arising 
under statute, the Amended Operating Agreement ("AORA"), or common law. 
Derivative Claims 
Defendants argue that as a result of the cash-out merger that extinguished MBC, Plaintiff lacks 
the standing to bring derivative claims on MBC's behalf in Count Two (Breach of Fiduciary Duty), 
Count Three (Aiding and Abetting Breach of Fiduciary Duty), and Count Four (Conspiracy to Breach 
Fiduciary Duties). The Court agrees. The effect of a merger is normally to deprive a plaintiff, a 
member of the merged company, the standing to bring a derivative suit.53 Two exceptions, however, 
are recognized to the post-merger derivative claim standing rule which allows the plaintiff to bring a 
derivative suit on behalf of a merged company: (1) if the merger itself is the subject of a claim of 
fraud, or (2) if the merger is in reality "merely a reorganization" that does not affect plaintiff's 
ownership in the business. 54 The fraud exception that the underlying merger was fraudulent and 
51 Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 (1991). See also, Danforth v. Bullman, 276 Ga. 531,532 
(2005). 
52 Diedrich v. Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects & Planners, Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). 
53 Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d 896, 899 (Del. 2004); see also, Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040 (Del. 
1984). 
54 Kramer v. Western Pacific Industries, Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 354 (Del. 1988), citing, Lewis v. Anderson, 
477 A.2d at 1046. 
15 
done to eliminate derivative claims must be pled with particularity. 55 Having failed to sufficiently 
plead either exception, the Court finds that Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the derivative claims. 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the derivative claims is hereby GRANTED. 
Direct Claims 
Defendants urge the Court to grant Summary Judgment on the direct claims on the grounds 
that Defendants breached no fiduciary duties owed to Plaintiffs because the AROA excuses 
compliance with certain fiduciary duties and because they had competing duties to creditors. 
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff is only entitled to an appraisal remedy post merger, or, in the 
alternative, if the merger is reviewed under the entire fairness test that it satisfies both the fair dealing 
and the fair price requirements of Delaware law. 
Fiduciarv Duties 
As Defendants emphasize to the Court, the Delaware Limited Liability Act (the "Act") is 
grounded in principles of freedom of contract. Delaware Code Chapter 6 Section 18-1101 authorizes 
the members of a limited liability company to restrict or expand duties, provided that the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated. Section 5.1 (b) of the MBC AROA provides that the 
"Management Board and Members shall have the powers, duties and authority described in this 
Section 5.1 (b) and under the Act. ... " Section 5.7 of the MBC AROA is a eXCUlpation provision that 
eliminated individual director liability to MBC or other members for "any acts or omissions performed 
or omitted in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed by the Member, Manager, or Officer to 
be within the scope of the authority conferred upon him/her or it by the Agreement and in the best 
interests of the Company." 
Defendants argue that the combined effect of Sections 5.1 and 5.7 of the AROA and §18-
1101 56 is to only create the duty of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
55 Lewis v. Ward, 852 A.2d at 905. 
56 Delaware Code Section 18-1101(e) which provides for the elimination or limitation of any and all 
liabilities for breach of contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, 
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Defendants' interpretation is overly broad. First, Section 18-1101 allows for members to restrict 
fiduciary duties by a provision in the operating agreement, but this statute requires express language 
in order to eliminate such duties. The default rule is that such duties exist, although they can be 
limited. Second, Section 5.1 of the AROA frames the members/managers' duties in the context of the 
Act and therefore, fiduciary duties exist except for such express limitations or restrictions. In the 
AROA, such limitations are found in the exculpation provision of Section 5.7 which only exculpates 
breaches of the duty of care. Liability is retained for acts done in the absence of "good faith" outside 
the scope of their authority and not reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the company. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Director Defendants owed fiduciary duties of good faith and 
loyalty to MBC and to its members. 
Squeeze Out Merger 
Plaintiff alleges that the Director Defendants' approval of the Programming merger was a self-
interested merger transaction that breached fiduciary duties owed to them. Defendants, on the other 
hand, counter that the approval of the merger was within the authority of the Board, and that the 
merger was approved by a vote of members who owned more than 50% of the company, and 
therefore, was permissible. 
Self-Interested Transaction: 
The facts of the case as outlined above demonstrate that a majority of the MBC Directors that 
approved the Programming merger were self-interested or not independent. Interest "requires an 
analysis of whether the director is disinterested in the underlying transaction and, even if 
disinterested, whether the director is otherwise independent.,,57 The common connection between 
all of the Defendants is Willie Gary, the former CEO and Chairman of the MBC Board at the time of 
manager or other person to a limited liability company ... provided, that a limited liability company 
agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad faith 
violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 
57 Beam ex reI. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004). 
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the Merger.58 Defendants Willie Gary, Lorenzo Williams and Maria Sperando held ownership 
interests in WGLLC, were Directors of MBC (and indirect members through WGLLC), and were listed 
as consenting shareholders to the GMC/Programming Merger. Both Gary and Williams voted in favor 
of the merger. Tom Weiksnar, a Board member of MBC, was also legal counsel for WGLLC, a Board 
member of MBC and would later serve as the secretary of Programming. Chan Bryant Abney and 
Lori Metoyer-Brown were members of WGLLC and Board members of MBC. Chan Bryan Abney 
also serves as General Counsel in Willie Gary's law firm. Lorenzo Williams, Maria Sperando and 
Tom Weiksnar are all attorneys at Gary's law firm. Additionally, although they did not vote to 
approve the merger, Cecil Fielder and Evander Holyfield were members of WGLLC, Officers of MBC 
(and indirect members through WGLLC), and signed the GMC/Programming Merger as consenting 
shareholders. 
The Programming Merger was not approved by a majority of disinterested Directors. Mathew 
Hardin, Jr., Marlon Jackson, Alvin James and Gregory Thorpe, the individual members of J&J, all 
voted against the merger. The remaining Directors either abstained from the vote (Feilder, Holyfield 
& Sperando) or voted to approve the merger with either an indirect interest in Programming (Abney, 
Gary, Williams) or had a relationship with Willie Gary such that their independence is questioned by 
this Court (Weiksnar and Metoyer-Brown}.59 
58 Willie Gary spearheaded the formation of WGLLC and is a founding partner of Gary, Williams, 
Finney, Lewis, Watson & Sperando. Maria Sperando and Lorenzo Williams are both partners. Tom 
Weiksnar and Chan Abney are both lawyers with the firm. Additionally, Lori Metoyer-Brown ran an 
independent business that produced settlement videos for the law firm. Evander Holyfield and Cecil 
Feilder are personal friends with Mr. Gary. 
59 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814-815 (Del. 1984). Guth v. Loft. Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 
1939) ("Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence 
to further their private interests. While technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the 
corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a 
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a 
corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous observance of his duty, 
not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to 
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or 
advantage which his skill and ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the 
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty 
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Absent approval by a majority of the minority shareholders, "the ultimate burden of proof is on 
the majority shareholder to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the transaction is fair.,,60 
Where directors of a Delaware corporation stand on both sides of a merger transaction, "[t]here is no 
'safe harbor' for such divided, loyalties .... [Directors] are required to demonstrate their utmost good 
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.,,61 This requirement of entire fairness is 
"unflinching in its demand that where one stands on both sides of a transaction, he has the burden of 
establishing its entire fairness, sufficient to pass the test of careful scrutiny by the courtS.,,62 Here, 
WGLLC stood on both sides of the transaction, as it was the 80% majority shareholder of MBC63 as 
well as the incorporator of Programming Acquisitions,64 the entity which survived the merger. Of the 
five members of the management Board of MBC who voted for the merger, all were members of 
WGLLC.65 Therefore, the Court shall review the Programming Merger under the entire fairness 
standard. 
to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest."). See. e.g., 
In re LNR Property Corp. Shareholders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 179 (Del. Ch. 2005) (finding that 
allegations of lack of director independence under an entire fairness review required denial of the 
corporate defendant's motion to dismiss). Cf., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 258 (Del. 2000) 
(affirming dismissal of breach of loyalty claims based upon evidence of lack of personal benefit). 
60 Weinberger v. UOP. Inc., 457 A.2d 701,703 (Del. 1983). 
61 Id. at 710 (citing Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., Del. Supr., 91 A.2d 57, 57-58 (1952)). 
62 Id. at 710 (citing Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., Del. Supr., 93 A.2d 107, 110 (1952); Bastian v. 
Bourns. Inc., DeI.Ch., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (1969), aff'd, Del. Supr., 278 A.2d 467 (1970); David J. 
Greene & Co. v. Dunhill International Inc., DeI.Ch., 249 A.2d 427, 431 (1968). 
63 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts at 29. 
64 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts at 166. 
65 Willie E. Gary, Lorenzo Williams, Chan Abney and Lori-Metoyer Brown voted for merger, were 
members of the management Board of MBC, and were members of both WGLLC and Programming 
Acquisitions. See Defendants' Statement of Material Facts at 163. Making matters slightly more 
confusing, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4,6,7,8 asserts that 
Weiksnar also was a member of WGLLC, along with Abney, Williams and Gary, but not necessarily 
Metoyer-Brown, who is simply identified as an "individual." Note, also, that according to Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment at 21, Weiksnar "was not a member 
of either J&J or WGLLC." lQ. citing Weiksnar Affd. 11115 and 6. 
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Entire Fairness: Fair Dealing & Fair Price 
The "entire fairness" requirement established in Weinberger is composed of two elements: "fair 
price" and "fair dealing.,,66 Fair dealing concerns the following: "qu~stions of when the transaction 
was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors, and how the 
approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained," as well as "the obvious duty of 
candor." 67 In dictum, the Weinberger court noted that the appointment of an "independent, 
negotiating committee of outside directors" to negotiate with minority shareholders can provide 
"strong evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.,,68 
The timing and the disclosures associated with the merger raise concerns regarding the 
process of merger approval. The Agenda for a Special Board Meeting, distributed on April 13th , 
disclosed that a potential merger was one of three planning agenda items. On April 14th , Matthew 
Hardin, on behalf of J&J, inquired with Newberger about the potential merger. Despite the March 
emails from WGLLC's counsel discussing a freeze out merger and the Newberger/Weiksnar emails 
on the 1 ih regarding the file memo on fiduciary duties in freeze out mergers, Newberger responded 
to Hardin stating that there was no merger proposal. Newberger feigned ignorance and 
communicated that the merger idea had just been floated "earlier that week" despite evidence to the 
contrary. The less than forthcoming disclosures by Newberger to J&J coupled with the condensed 
consideration of the merger proposal raise serious red flags, and create jury questions in this case. 
When the MBC Board met on the 18th and discussed planning options for the company, they 
voted to form a committee to make a recommendation on which planning option to pursue.69 Of the 
five named to serve, two (Chan Abney and Lorenzo Williams) were indirect owners of Programming 
66 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 711. 
67 Id.at 712. 
68 Id.at 709 n.7. See also Jackson v. Turnbull, 1994 WL 174668 (Del. Ch., 1989) (discussing statutory 
violation as ground for invalidating merger as a "threshold issue" for determining fairness in a merger 
transaction ). 
69 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts at 155, 156. 
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Acquisitions through their ownership in WGLLE.70 However, according to the Defendants, Williams 
"was not present for the discussions.,,71 Weiksnar, as counsel for WGLLC, had been involved in the 
merger discussions for over a month at the time of his appointment to the committee. The fourth and 
fifth members of this committee, Alvin James & Matthew Harden Jr., were indirect minority 
shareholders of MBC through their ownership interest in J&J. They both favored the bankruptcy 
option over the proposed merger. After a two-day investigation, the committee reconvened at the 
continued Special Board meeting on April 20th and recommended the proposed merger with 
Programming. Thereafter, the merger closed on April 26, 2006. 
The fast pace of the Programming merger alone is insufficient grounds for the Court to find 
questions of fact regarding the fairness of the merger. The record, however, is also devoid of 
evidence of negotiations between Programming and MBC. Programming, was formed on April 19th , 
which was the day after the MBC Board first discussed the merger with Programming by WGLLC. 
Second, there is no evidence of price or transaction term negotiations between the two parties. Third, 
the valuation appraisal by Shannon Pratt was the basis for concluding that MBC had a negative value 
for purposes of establishing the cash out price of $1.00. The Shannon Pratt valuation, was originally 
commissioned by WGLLC, the majority shareholder of MBC, and whose members formed 
Programming.72 Additionally, the written valuation report prepared by Shannon Pratt was not 
completed until May, after the committee or the Board's vote on the proposed merger. While 
Defendants' counsel represented that the Board received oral reports on the value of MBC, an oral 
report is not subject to review, evaluation or independent analysis. Additionally, where as here there 
was no opportunity for a market check, no record of price/term negotiation, and where the merger 
was an interested-director transactions quickly pushed through before an uninformed and dissenting 
minority shareholder, the Court cannot hold as Defendants urge it to that the merger was the result of 
70 Order on Motion to Dismiss at 1. Lorenzo Williams also signed the GMC/Programming Merger as a 
consenting shareholder. 
71 Defendant's Statement of Material Facts at 156. 
72 Defendants' Statement of Material Facts at 160, 161, 168. 
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fair dealings. Finally, the special committee was not comprised of a majority of independent directors, 
but rather of WGLLC members or affiliates, and therefore is not strong evidence of "fairness" as 
contemplated in Weinberger. 
Fair price, the corollary to fair dealing, "relates to the economic and financial considerations of 
the proposed merger, including all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, 
and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock.,,73 A 
significant result of Weinberger was that the Court explicitly broadened the approach to determining 
price by declaring that "[flair price obviously requires consideration of all relevant factors.,,74 Although 
speculative elements of value arising from the "accomplishment or expectation of the merger" are 
excluded from the determination of price, "all relevant factors" does include "elements of future 
value, including the nature of the enterprise, which are known or susceptible of proof as of the date of 
the merger and not the product of speculation.,,75 
Defendants' argument on the fair price element is best summarized as a contention that the 
Court has no authority to review the price outside of an appraisal remedy, which is not the action 
before this Court, nor is it authorized by the AROA. Such an argument, however, does not take into 
consideration the full panoply of Delaware law discussing post-merger remedies. 
Defendants incorrectly rely upon Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,76 for the proposition that appraisal 
remedies are the exclusive remedy in freeze-out cases. Weinberger also preserved the equity 
powers of courts in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, waste, and over-reaching.,,77 In 
addition, Weinberger allowed a shareholder who dissents from a merger to seek rescissionary 
73 Id. at 712. 
74 Id. at 713 (emphasis added). 
75 lQ. For a short but incisive discussion of the limits of the appraisal remedy from the point of view of 
minority stockholders, see Helen M. Richards, Comment, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.: A Whole 
New Ball Game for Dissenting Shareholders, 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 999,1003-06 (1989) ("It is, in short, 
a remedy of desperation."). 
76 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
77 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. 
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damages.78 Such damages are available at the discretion of the Court or in appraisal proceedings.79 
Rescissionary damages are measured "by the equivalent value of corporate stock at the time of the 
judgment.,,80 
Two years after Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt 
Chemical Corp. ,81 which highlighted the rule that "in cases of procedural unfairness the standard of 
entire fairness entitles [a plaintiff] to relief that is broader than an appraisaL" 82 Rabkin further held 
that 'Weinberger's mandate of fair dealing does not turn solely on issues of deception.,,83 
In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,84 decided in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed 
for the first time the question of whether a shareholder who had dissented from a cash-out merger 
and begun an appraisal proceeding may pursue a subsequently discovered individual claim of fraud 
in the merger. Cede & Co. summarized the distinction between a section 262 appraisal action85 and 
a fraud breach of fiduciary action asserting fair dealing and fair price claims, such as are in the instant 
case. 
In a section 262 appraisal action, "the only litigable issue is the determination of the value of 
the appraisal petitioners' shares on the date of the merger, the only party defendant is the surviving 
78 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. "The value of the stock under a recessionary damages formula is 
calculated at the time of trial. As a result, it reflects upswings in the market, turns for the better in the 
fortunes of the company, and changes in the business wrought by the acquiring company." Booth 
79 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703-04,714 (overruling Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 429 A.2d 497 
(Del. Ch. 1981), to hold that there is no requirement to impose a recessionary damages formula when 
unfairness is found but that such authority lies under the discretion of the Chancellor)). 
80 19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2215 n. 2 (citing Harman v. Masoneilan Intern., Inc., 442 A.2d 487 
(1982) and Weinberger v. UQP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (1983)). "Rescissory damages," are those 
"contemplated to restore a plaintiff to the position occupied before the defendant's wrongful acts." 
Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed., 2004). 
81 498 A.2d 1099 (1985). Note, Rabkin was before the court on a motion to dismiss. 
82 Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1103. 
83 Id. at 1104-05. 
84 542 A.2d 1182 (1988). 
85 8 DeI.C. § 262. An appraisal remedy under Delaware law gives a shareholder the right to dissent 
from a corporate merger or consolidation, and instead obtain "the fair value of the stockholder'S 
shares of stock" from the corporation under certain circumstances. Id. at subd (a). Subdivision (d) 
sets out a detailed procedure for how those rights shall be perfected and subdivision (h) details how 
the court shall determine the fair value of the shares. 
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corporation, and the only relief available is a judgment against the surviving corporation for the fair 
value of the dissenters' shares.,,86 
In contrast, a fraud breach of fiduciary duty action "affords an expansive remedy and is brought 
against the alleged wrongdoers to provide whatever relief the facts of a particular case may 
require.,,87 Under Delaware law, "the scope of recovery for a breach of the duty of loyalty is not to be 
determined narrowly .... The strict imposition of penalties ... [is] designed to discourage 
disloyalty.,,88 Additionally, "[o]nce shareholders prove that the merger was wrongfully accomplished, 
they may also receive compensatory and punitive damages, including the ability to litigate the value 
of the merged corporation's stock.,,89 Relief may further include: "any damages sustained by the 
shareholders,90 as well as "rescissionary damages if the [trier of fact] considers them susceptible of 
proof and a remedy appropriate to all issues of fairness before him.,,91 
In this matter, Plaintiffs have opposed the Shannon Pratt report by submitting their own expert 
valuation report. Additionally, Plaintiffs point to post-merger events as evidence that the $1.00 
purchase price was not a "fair price". Specifically, Plaintiffs highlight the Gospel Music Channel 
merger in April 2007 which was valued at approximately $25 million and included assets such as 
certain distribution agreements that were assets of MBC at the time of the Programming merger. 
The Court finds that Plaintiffs are not limited to an appraisal action in this case. Additionally, 
without making any determination as to the actual fairness of the MBC/Programming merger price, 
the Court finds that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the price of the 
merger was entirely fair, and thus they are not entitled to summary judgment on this issue. 
86 Cede, 542 A.2d at 1187. 
87~ 
88 International Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 441 (Del. Sup., 2000) (citing Thorpe 
by Castleman v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436, 445 (DeI.1996). 
89 Cohen v. Mirage Resorts, Inc., 62 P.3d 720 (Nev., 2003) (citing Cede, 542 A.2d at 1191). 
90Cede, 542 A.2d at 1187 (citing Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1107; Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713). 
91 lQ. at 1187-88 (citing Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714); see also International Telecharge, 766 A.2d at 
440 (observing that the powers of the trial court are "very broad in fashioning equitable and monetary 
relief under the entire fairness standard as may be appropriate, including rescissory damages") .. " 
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Duties to Creditors 
Defendants finally argue, citing Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications CO.,92 and Blackmore Partners, 
L.P. v. Link Energy LLC, 93 that they, as directors of MBC, owed a special duty to the company's 
creditors because MBC was operating in the "zone of insolvency,,94 at the time of the merger decision. 
Defendants argue that their fiduciary duties "shift[ed] from the owners to the creditors.,,95 
First, as discussed above, whether MBC was operating in the zone of insolvency is a disputed 
question of fact, as there is conflicting evidence in the record on the value of MBC at the time of the 
merger. Second, the theory upon which Defendants base their argument is distinguishable from the 
instant case. Defendants cite Blackmore for the authority that MBC's Board had a fiduciary duty to 
"take into account the interest of creditors at the apparent expense of stockholders if, in doing so, the 
Board meets its fiduciary duties to all relevant constituencies.,,96 In Blackmore, the transaction at 
issue was approved by an independent board majority and a special committee made up entirely of 
independent directors.97 In the instant case, the committee contained a majority of interested 
directors, and the transaction was approved only by interested, not independent, directors. 
Additionally, the duties to creditors theory is a mechanism to protect the contractual rights of third 
parties, not a legal mechanism to expand directorial duties beyond the terms of the contracts at 
issue.98 The Court therefore rejects Defendants' argument that the Director Defendants' approval of 
the merger was a valid exercise of their fiduciary duty owed to creditors. 
92 621 A2d 784 (1992). 
93 2005 WL 2709639 (2005). 
94 Defendants' Memorandum at 38. 
95 Id. At 38. 
96 Id. Quoting Blackmore, 2005 WL 2709639 
97 Blackmore, 2005 WL 2709639 at 7. 
98 See e.g., Laura Linn, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors 
Duty to Creditors 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1487-88 (1993). 
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UNCLEAN HANDS 
In light of the foregoing discussion, the Court is not persuaded that the allegations of unclean 
hands asserted against the Plaintiffs are a basis for granting summary judgment to Defendants in this 
case. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED as to all Derivative Claims 
and hereby DENIED as to all Direct Claims. 
SO ORDERED this f day of ~ ,2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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